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7  |  Political becoming and non-state  
emergence in Kenya’s security sector:  
Mungiki as security operator
Jacob Rasmussen
Global security assemblage and ethnographies of non-state security
Over the last decades, Kenya has gone through a series of political upheavals 
and societal changes. In addition to these internal developments, changing 
international security interests in the eastern African region and shifting global 
dynamics in the security sector have transformed the security landscape of 
Kenya dramatically. This chapter investigates how the reconfiguration of the 
security sector in Kenya has provided opportunities for new and alternative 
actors and how it has produced new alliances within the sector. Investigating 
the security sector at a time of transformation and change, the chapter reveals 
how the new opportunities and alliances are unstable and in a constant process 
of emergence, which presents the different actors a space for political influence 
and political becoming. The chapter focuses on the Mungiki movement and 
its involvement in the social and political upheavals in Kenya as an example 
of how non-state actors can find their way into the security sector and how 
they use security as a tool for organizational institutionalization and political 
becoming. Mungiki was one of the main perpetrators in the 2007/08 post-
electoral violence, at the same time that the organization has been systemati-
cally persecuted by state security agents. This presents Mungiki as an intriguing 
case for investigating how the politics of security plays out.
The chapter draws on long-term ethnographic fieldwork on the Mungiki 
movement and shows how the everyday considerations and experiences of 
non-state actors assists us in understanding security as a process of emergence; 
hence it supplements more mainstream studies of security that tend to focus 
on the role of the state and formal institutions. Despite the local focus of 
the chapter, the global dynamics in the security sector and their influence 
on security politics and practices in Kenya frame the analyses of Mungiki as 
security provider. Rita Abrahamsen’s and Michael Williams’ global security 
assemblage theory elaborates how different actors interact and compete in 
a transformed security sector; hence it provides an analytical framework for 
unpacking the complex transformations within the Kenyan security sector 
(see Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 90).




It is argued that ethnographies of non-state actors in relation to global 
security assemblages add insights well beyond the global by inserting under-
standings of everyday processes of emergence and becoming usually left out 
of the more generalized analyses of the workings of security politics. The 
predominant statist perspective of much of the private security literature over-
looks the non-state perspective, though some of the drivers and expressions 
tend to be similar. Therefore, using Mungiki to show how localized expressions 
of security emerge as part of the global security assemblages, the chapter adds 
nuances to how apparently marginal events and actors are nevertheless at the 
centre of how power is produced and problematized (see Roitman 2005: 419).
Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams define global security assemblages 
as ‘complex, multi-sited institutional orders where a range of different security 
agents interact, cooperate, and compete to produce new practices and structures 
of security governance’ (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 95). Abrahamsen and 
Williams build on Saskia Sassen’s argument on global assemblage theory, which 
posits that the state is no longer the primary focus for organizing governance 
(this also applies to the security sector); rather, the analytical attention is directed 
towards new actors, new relations and new roles (Sassen 2006; Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2010: 89). Hence, this chapter investigates how a new actor like 
Mungiki establishes and maintains its relations to the state while carving out 
a new role for itself in the security sector and in Kenyan society in general. 
Abrahamsen and Williams argue that the transformation of global structures 
happens in three phases: first, a process of disassembly where public functions 
are outsourced or taken up by private actors; second, a development phase 
where the private actors or non-state actors acquire new capacities that enable 
them to operate at the global level; and the last phase involves the process 
of reassembly in which the new actors become part of global assemblages 
embedded in national settings, yet operate on a global scale (ibid.: 91). 
Their focus is on the role of private security companies within the security 
sector. However, rather than writing off the role of the state as diminishing, 
as much globalization theory has tended to do, Abrahamsen and Williams 
argue that the state is not per se losing its power or authority owing to such 
transformations of the security sector; instead the state plays a key role in 
enabling new actors and new relations to emerge (ibid.: 91; cf. Sassen 2006). 
Furthermore, the incorporation of new actors in the new security assemblages 
produces new practices and structures of security governance owing to the 
constant interaction, cooperation and competition amongst actors (Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2010: 95). The global in this regard is constituted by the disas-
sembly of public functions, thereby changing the role of the state without 
necessarily diminishing its authority; the state now enables alliances between 
new and old actors connected to global systems. The state has encouraged 
private security companies to operate within state structures which have 
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enabled them to build their capacity; a similar observation can be made in 
regard to non-state security actors like Mungiki. Therefore, looking at the 
changed role of the state and its changing relations to new security actors 
also provides the opportunity to look at non-state actors like Mungiki within 
the framework of the global security assemblage. 
Before going into the ethnographic accounts of Mungiki’s security engage-
ments, it is necessary to gain an understanding of how the Kenyan security 
sector has transformed over time and what role the state has played through 
these transformations. Following the analytical overview of fragmentation 
within the security sector in Kenya the chapter builds up to the ethnographi-
cally informed section on Mungiki. The analysis of Mungiki through the lens 
of global security assemblages is focused on Mungiki’s relation to the Kenyan 
state and politics, justice and authority, as well as how the movement has been 
able to find its way into the security sector. In conclusion, it is argued that 
Mungiki is both part of the wider security sector and subjected to the security 
practices of the state, and shows how this ambiguous position of Mungiki in 
Kenyan society carves out a peculiar space for political becoming.
Framing security reform and the disassembly of the security  
sector in Kenya
The fall of President Moi’s oppressive regime and the change to multiparty 
democracy in 1992 formally initiated a change that had been brewing at the 
grassroots level and in civil society circles up through the 1980s; though it 
took another ten years before the long-serving KANU party was replaced by 
NARC (National Rainbow Coalition). In addition to these democratic tenden-
cies, which at the surface level promised oversight and a changed role for the 
police, the 2007 elections erupted into violent clashes driven by political and 
ethnic clashes following allegations of electoral fraud. These violent clashes 
initiated a range of transformative processes including investigative commis-
sions, juridical and police reforms, and a constitutional referendum in 2010, 
as well as interventions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and UN 
special rapporteurs. The commissions and tribunals were to analyse the roots 
of the conflict and, in turn, provide for future reconciliation and resilience 
in the fact of conflict. As such, the post-electoral violence (PEV) became the 
catalyst for actually initiating security reforms and for commissions to look 
into past atrocities, such as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (TJRC), alongside ongoing police reforms. The flawed elections fuelled a 
political crisis shaped in part by an upsurge in youth militarization in which 
the Mungiki movement has been placed at the centre on the one hand and, 
on the other, of particular interest to Al-Shabaab. 
In the same period, Kenya has become a target of international terrorism, 
noted in the 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Nairobi, the 2013 Westgate 




shopping mall attack, and the 2015 Garissa University College attacks, all of 
which have attracted global attention. Partly as a consequence of these attacks 
in Kenya, and as a consequence of neighbouring countries hosting training 
grounds for international terrorist groupings, Kenya has become an important 
ally for Western-led anti-terror initiatives. Furthermore, for the first time as an 
independent nation, in 2011 Kenya undertook offensive military interventions 
in a foreign state through its attacks on the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia.
Taken together, these developments have seen the security dynamics of 
Kenya drastically reconfigured. Internal political and ethnic conflicts, external 
military engagements, large-scale corruption of public funds, and political 
wrangles regarding how best to avoid the challenges of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) have influenced how various arms of the Kenyan police 
and military relate to one another and to the wider public. In addition, private 
security operators and non-state security actors alike are tangled up in struggles 
about how to define, provide and govern security in Kenya. In the following I 
trace the political development of security in Kenya by showing how security 
politics in Kenya in different ways have been centred on maintaining political 
power, pointing in turn to the close links between security forces and domestic 
political interests. 
Securing the one-party state At independence in 1963, Kenyan’s common 
goal of overcoming colonialism through national unity was achieved. Soon after, 
opposition to the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party arose. 
In an attempt to prolong the unity of independence and to strengthen its grip 
on power, KANU co-opted and crushed the opposition and effectively became 
synonymous with the Kenyan state. It was a challenge to avoid divisions among 
the more than forty different ethnic groupings while simultaneously retaining 
the power of the state. KANU refined the colonial ‘ideology of order’ by building 
up an increasingly repressive regime, where order was a tool with which the 
ruling elite repressed political opposition, dissidents and people who insisted 
on accountability, and in general kept the governed in place (Odhiambo 1987: 
189–91). What was left of the Mau Mau rebellions from the 1950s anti-colonial 
fight for land and freedom was crushed. Rather than as a defensive bulwark 
against foreign threats, President Jomo Kenyatta structured the military forces 
to consolidate state power by centralizing the control of the military and further 
enhancing the ethnic dimension of the military left by the colonial regime 
to ensure it suited the interests of the political elite (Katumanga 2013: 137). 
The paramilitary police structures of the General Service Unit (GSU) and the 
Administration Police (AP) were placed directly under presidential command 
to counter internal threat from factions within the military (ibid.: 138–9). 
In repressing early opposition, the regime also dismissed alternative ideas 
of decentralizing power, most notably the notion of majimboism (regionalism). 
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On another level, the Kikuyu elite tried to conceal and silence internal divi-
sions within the Kikuyu community (the largest of Kenya’s forty-two ethnic 
groups, composing close to 20 per cent of the population) to keep grip on 
power (Lonsdale 2002). Further, a series of (alleged) state-sanctioned killings 
of opposition figures took place: opposition politicians such as Pio Gamma 
Pinto and Tom Mboya were killed in the 1960s, J. M. Kariuki in 1975, and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko in 1990 (Cohen and Odhiambo 2004: 
4–6). Coupled with large-scale corruption scandals, these killings remain at 
the core of what civil society has dubbed Kenya’s culture of impunity, which 
continued in the post-electoral violence of 2008, the extrajudicial killings of 
Mungiki members from 2007 to 2009, and in the recent killings of Muslims 
preachers (KNCHR 2008; Alston 2009; Al Jazeera 2014). 
At the death of the first independent president, the Kikuyu Jomo Kenyatta 
in 1978, Daniel Arap Moi from the smaller tribe the Kalenjin assumed the 
presidency. Following a failed coup against him in 1982, Moi turned Kenya 
into a de facto one-party state, as well as initiating an ethnic change of guard 
within central security units like the GSU and the Special Branch (Katumanga 
2013: 140). Moi was president for twenty-four years and, even after caving 
in to the popular pressure for multiparty elections in 1992, managed to use 
oppressive mechanisms and divisive political strategies to remain in power 
for two consecutive multiparty elections. During the struggle for multiparty 
democracy in the early 1990s Moi’s regime revived the idea of majimboism 
but with an outspoken ethnic dimensions intended to create divisions – the 
regime successfully played on inherent tensions between the regions and the 
nation (see Anderson 2010: 23). Moi deployed the secret intelligence service – 
Special Branch (known for its widespread use of torture) – to clamp down on 
opposition leaders, intellectuals and the general citizenry (Katumanga 2013: 140). 
Democratization and increased security fragmentation
Democratization in 1992 increased the contestation over the presidency as 
politicians were now guaranteed only five years in power during which they 
could extract wealth from the state (Branch 2011). The increased competi-
tion led to fragmentation of the political elite (Branch and Cheeseman 2008; 
Kagwanja and Southall 2010: 3).
The ethnic clashes surrounding the elections in the 1990s were in some 
ways opportune for Moi’s regime as they demonstrated the ‘dangers’ of political 
pluralism and legitimized enduring state oppression. Through the 1990s, the 
use of youth gangs as political and ethnic militias to create political disorder 
became a widespread instrument in the quest to maintain power (Kagwanja 
2001; Katumanga 2005). Despite the employment of youth militias to commit 
and take the blame for the extralegal violence of the state (Kagwanja 2001), 
the president retained strong control over the police and the military, which 




since independence have seen a continuous creation of special units loyal to the 
needs of shifting presidents (Musila 2012: 159–60; Katumanga 2013). However, 
with the informalization of political violence and security, the state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of violence has been eroded (Branch and Cheeseman 
2008; Kagwanja and Southall 2010; Mueller 2008).
Owing in part to the economic crisis in the 1980s and political developments 
in the 1990s, Kenya suffered from a reputation for violence and crime (Gimode 
2001; Katumanga 2005; UN Habitat 2002). The scarce police presence in many 
areas reduced residents’ faith in the police as an institution and their legitimacy 
as providers of security. Furthermore, many Nairobi residents perceived the 
police as part of the criminal problem as much as they saw them as the solution 
to it (Gimode 2001: 321–2; Katumanga 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 
202–4). Similar patterns describe the relation between the state and residents 
of the northern territories and large parts of the Kenyan coast. Inspired by 
community policing projects from the USA and South Africa, Kenya decided 
to introduce community policing initiatives in Nairobi to improve the level of 
security and restore faith in the police through closer relations with communi-
ties (Brogden 2005; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003). The community policing 
pilot projects sought to build trust in the police and fight crime at the same 
time, but they failed as they were neither implemented nor assessed properly 
(Brogden 2005: 77–8). As many of the areas had established traditions of 
running their own security initiatives, community policing initiatives were 
to some extent perceived as legitimizing vigilantism, which over the years 
helped to establish local youth gangs as quasi-legitimate security providers (see 
Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003). However, the police have continually resolved 
to respond robustly and, in so doing, have continued to neglect underlying 
factors when responding to crime and violence in the poor neighbourhoods 
of Kenya’s urban centres (Ruteere et al. 2013).
This community policing initiative reflects a wider problem of not only a 
lack of trust in the police but also a general experience of a security shortage 
whereby state security forces have been used for regime consolidation rather 
than for providing individual or public security (Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012: 
31–2), a tendency that has seen a growth in private security provision at all 
levels of Kenyan society (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 198). Nairobi has 
been labelled as a city under siege, owing not only to the crime rate but also 
to the fractured and competing security operators, and there seems to be little 
coordination between the police, private security companies and non-state 
actors, resulting in uneven access to security provision and a blurring of lines 
between different actors (Colona and Jaffe 2016).
Besides these domestic developments, the 1990s also witnessed an expan-
sion of military forces intended to build the capacity to engage in military 
operations outside Kenya while still having the capacity to tackle internal 
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threats to order (Katumanga 2013). Conflicts in Somalia, northern Uganda, 
Rwanda and Sudan had spillover effects on Kenya in terms of refugees and 
the arms trade, which forced Kenya to deal with the security threats from 
its neighbours (Murunga 2005: 144–5). The conflicts also introduced further 
Western and international aid and security presence in Kenya’s border regions, 
and Kenya’s international role in regional and international security conflicts 
was further enhanced by the 1998 terrorist attack on the US embassy in Nairobi. 
Suddenly Kenya was a key player in regional stabilization in terms of managing 
development aid and refugee support. It also become a central actor in the 
war on terror, which influenced sharing of security and intelligence reports 
as well as a foreign military presence in the form of training and support 
to the Kenyan military. The recent focus on piracy off the coast of Somalia 
has encouraged Kenya to address maritime security to protect both national 
and international threats to market and trade interests, which has resulted in 
international development support of the Kenyan marine. As with the war on 
terror, Kenya was also under pressure from the international community to 
play a central judicial role in battling piracy (Taussig-Rubbo 2011). However, 
Kenya declined to take on the role of supporting international justice at a time 
when their current president (Uhuru Kenyatta) and vice-president (William 
Ruto) had pending cases at the ICC. Furthermore, Kenya’s military engagements 
against Al-Shabaab in Somalia since November 2011 have also marked a shift 
in how Kenya approaches external security threats and how they are linked 
to international security politics (Olsen 2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015).
Securitization of Africa 
One of the central global influences on the disassembly of the Kenyan 
security sector is the merger of security and development (Abrahamsen 2005; 
Collier and Ong 2005: 18; Duffield 2001). Abrahamsen criticizes Western foreign 
politics for increasingly being based on an understanding of Africa as a danger 
and a threat to the international community, what she calls the securitiza-
tion of Africa (Abrahamsen 2005: 56). Abrahamsen refers to the Copenhagen 
School of security studies and their theoretical understanding of how particular 
speech-acts allow and legitimize a security intervention or a securitization 
move (cf. Buzan et al. 1998). However, she argues that the discourse on the 
securitization of Africa is more than merely a linguistic act, and that it has 
real and practical implications on the ground when the international focus 
on the continent shifts from development to becoming primarily organized 
around security (Abrahamsen 2005: 68). 
This tendency is especially prevalent in the global war on terror, and in 
eastern Africa this process has been accentuated following terrorist attacks in 
Kenya on both Western and Kenyan targets. The politics Abrahamsen criticizes 
builds on the increased merging of security and development in politics and 




practice (cf. Duffield 2001; Buur et al. 2007). One of the key claims of the 
security–development nexus is that poverty acts as a catalyst for particular 
violent threats such as terrorism, meaning that a securitizing of poverty is not 
only necessary but in itself justifies a security intervention. Similar discourses 
and actual interventions have been applied by the Kenyan state to Mungiki and 
more recently to Al-Shabaab, manifesting themselves as extrajudicial killings 
by secret police squads (Rasmussen 2010; KNCHR 2008; Al Jazeera 2014). 
Following this logic, for the state to provide more viable solutions to the 
poor and marginalized population it needs to secure them first, and herein 
lies the ambiguity that securing the poor means providing security for them 
and making sure that they don’t present a security threat to the wider society. 
In the case of Mungiki, the state has used secret death squads to ‘free’ Kenya 
from what it presents as a violent and brutal menace, similar to the rhetoric 
that has been used in the militant clampdown on so-called radical Muslim 
clerics associated with Al Shabaab mobilization. Ironically, both Mungiki and 
the Muslim clerics claim legitimacy by representing the interests of the poor 
and marginalized citizenry. Secret death squads have been a way for the state 
to deal with political and security threats, yet they threaten to undermine the 
legitimacy of the state’s security interventions while adding to an increasing 
militarization of society.
The above outline of the main transformations of the Kenyan security sector 
has shown how the Kenyan state since independence has been an important 
co-producer of ethnic politics as well as continuously fragmenting the security 
landscape. The state’s history of oppression and accumulation of personal wealth 
has effectively created a culture of impunity where the key objective has been 
preserving state power in the hands of the elite. Chief Justice Willy Mutunga 
has called the current Kenyan state of affairs a ‘bandit economy’ where political 
leaders control criminal cartels that extort the citizens, who live in fear of 
violent repercussions if they speak out against them (Lindijer 2016). These 
politics have simultaneously undermined the state’s ability to legitimately keep 
order and provide security and eroded its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence. The internal focus on keeping power has influenced how security is 
practised and performed by a variety of actors and has coincided with a global 
attention to security matters that increasingly affect Kenya. These developments 
have created room for a variety of national and international security actors 
(both formal and informal) to enter the scene of security politics and security 
provision in Kenya. 
The above provides an understanding of some of the broader political 
dynamics underlying Kenya’s political crisis and the changing processes of 
disassembly of the security sector. The Mungiki movement is situated amidst 
these political processes and practices characterized by exclusion, corruption, 
oppression, violence, impunity and exception to the rule, all of which are 
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central grievances for Mungiki against the Kenyan state. All are central aspects 
of how security manifests itself in practice and influence how Mungiki and 
other security actors have to negotiate and navigate their role in Kenyan 
security politics. In the following, I briefly introduce the Mungiki movement 
to situate it against this understanding of the broader dynamics of Kenyan 
security politics as it is currently being reassembled. 
Mungiki as a vehicle for social and political becoming
Since its formation in Central Province in the early 1990s, Mungiki has been 
labelled as a youth gang, a political militia, a vigilante group, a millenarian 
movement, a traditionalist sect, a grassroots organization and a political party 
(Servant 2007; Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2005; Kilonzo 2008; Wamue 2001; 
Gecaga 2007). The movement has been engaged in activities that justify the 
use of each of the categories to describe particular aspects of the movement 
at given times. The simultaneity of these activities points to the dynamic 
and transformational potential of Mungiki and emphasizes its continuous but 
changing relation to the state and to the society it operates in. 
In the Kikuyu language Mungiki means multitude, masses or people. As such, 
the emic term for the movement has its own descriptive value in defining the 
movement as indeterminable. Mungiki often try to capitalize on this indeter-
minacy both in terms of the strength of their numbers and in terms of their 
actual practices (Rasmussen 2013). On one hand, Mungiki’s ability to gather 
huge crowds at political and religious rallies testifies to their ability to show 
numerical strength, yet their actual support base is indeterminate. On the 
other hand, as their involvement in the PEV and their control of local security 
exemplify, their ability to constantly establish uncertainty about their actions 
and intentions (whether peaceful or violent) reveals the indeterminacy in 
character. Mungiki continuously downplay their violent engagements, yet there 
is always a latent potentiality for violence, which lives through narratives of 
their brutal killings and through the secret ritual oaths performed at initiation 
into the movement. As such, Mungiki embodies a certain level of political 
agency through its name; they appear to have the potential to form a mass 
movement of disenfranchised youth who can potentially make a democratic 
difference through their sheer numbers, and they appear to have the ability 
to influence politics through the potential threat of masses of violent youth 
running amok. 
Mungiki’s main recruitment base is amongst poor and disenfranchised 
Kikuyu youth – to begin with in poor rural areas and later in Nairobi’s informal 
settlements. The poor youth is often seen as a challenge to Kenyan society, 
owing due to their numbers and partly because they face unemployment 
and limited access to political participation, hence providing for a potential 
conflictual relation to society. When youths are mobilized into Mungiki they 




become political and they become ambiguously positioned in relation to the 
wider set of security practices; first, Mungiki is an officially illegal movement, 
which makes the members potential subjects of the state’s violent actions as 
exemplified by extrajudicial killings. That is in itself political. Second, Mungiki 
cells operate as security providers on a local level as they have provided their 
violent services to the Kikuyu political elite on a number of occasions. This 
places Mungiki as an alternative to state security provision, yet at the same 
time as a subcontractor of state-sanctioned security and violence. On the one 
hand Mungiki fills a gap in poor urban areas left by state security operators, 
and on the other hand they perform violent acts outsourced by the state. 
Finally, the fact that some Mungiki members were amongst the ICC witnesses 
against Uhuru Kenyatta has added a political dimension to the membership of 
Mungiki, as they could potentially influence presidential politics and notions 
of justice and national authority.
The localized and everyday perspective of non-state actors like Mungiki 
challenges the framework of global security assemblage theory as it reveals 
the friction between the state and non-state actors like Mungiki as the lines 
separating the public from the private are transformed. At the same time, it 
reveals how the global assemblage is defined as much by the exclusions it 
produces (see Collier and Ong 2005: 12). Whereas Abrahamsen and Williams 
in their work on the global security assemblages focus on private security 
companies in part using Nairobi as a case example (Abrahamsen and Williams 
2010: 172), Mungiki provides insights into how the poor residents of Nairobi 
outside the walled neighbourhoods guarded by private security companies 
seek security and protection. Abrahamsen and Williams argue that cities are 
the sites of struggle over security, and cities are the sites where new forms of 
security governance transgress the boundaries between public and private, and 
where the global and the local emerge (ibid.: 174–5). Mungiki, in this view, 
displays how localized expressions of security emerge as part of the global 
security assemblages while their seemingly local engagements nevertheless 
influence how power is produced and problematized.
Becoming a member of Mungiki is a highly ritualized process, and it means 
becoming a member of a moral and religious community. New members must 
undergo baptism and take an oath of unity at their initiation into the move-
ment; it marks the formal process of becoming a member of Mungiki and it 
is an important way of investing the members with the power of Mungiki’s 
knowledge, history and traditions, which are to a large extent a reinvention of 
Mau Mau rituals and practices. After initiation, members are placed in local 
cells named after the traditional Kikuyu warrior bands that were also the 
inspiration for the organization of Mau Mau. The religious aspects of Mungiki 
are often presented as demonic and uncivilized practices (cf. Kilonzo 2008; 
Knighton 2009), which has the effect of reducing the movement’s multiplicity 
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to a singular identity. Stressing the production of identity in Mungiki’s hetero-
geneity allows for violent engagements to be part of what makes up Mungiki 
while nevertheless allowing these engagements to take a political character 
(Frederiksen 2010). 
Mungiki organize themselves along the lines of the old Mau Mau warrior 
bands, and in doing so they reinvent themselves as revolutionaries in the 
present and invest in themselves the powers of the past. By linking their identity 
to the Mau Mau movement, Mungiki establishes a common place in Kenyan 
history for the members that provides an ideological point of reference and a 
position in society as marginalized and largely unrecognized. The importance 
of such identity politics and their influence on political becoming and violent 
actions is often overlooked through the lens of global assemblage theory. 
While the analytical inclusion of identity politics positions the movement 
within a broader history of order and security in Kenya as global security 
assemblage theory also would, it adds an everyday perspective of emergence 
to the motives and understanding of Mungiki’s normative positioning vis-à-vis 
the Kenyan state. 
Focusing on the relational aspects between Mungiki and the state allows 
us to move analytically beyond the violent engagements as purely criminal 
and illegal and instead to understand them as tantamount to the politics of 
security. Through the lens of security, we can see how Mungiki’s relation to the 
Kenyan state is constantly shifting, and it reveals how authority is renegotiated 
and how the state enables militarized youth groupings as proxies for violent 
actions yet simultaneously tries to control or even dismantle them. 
Investigating Mungiki and their security engagements through the lens 
of global security assemblage theory places the movement within a broader 
analytical frame than usually applied to them, as it positions them analyti-
cally on an equal footing with formal institutions like the police and the 
military. In so doing we can focus on the relational aspect between Mungiki 
and the state without solely focusing on antagonism or conflict, but also on 
what that relation reveals about how security is produced and negotiated by 
a variety of different actors inside Kenya. Furthermore, it moves beyond the 
instrumentalist approaches often used to describe Mungiki’s relation to the 
state, where Mungiki is seen mainly as young guns for hire to politicians. 
Emphasizing the constantly shifting relations between Mungiki and the 
Kenyan state presents Mungiki with some agency and hence as an emergent 
political actor. Furthermore, including the ethnographic perspective of a non-
state actor like Mungiki adds an everyday perspective not prioritized to the 
same extent in Abrahamsen and Williams’ macro-level political analyses of 
various security actors and how they are connected to each other and to global 
flows. In some ways, the ethnographic perspective might come at the cost of 
a wider generalizability and larger-scale political analysis, but it contributes 




an understanding of and a view on the everyday and mundane and its role 
in the production of the global assemblages (see Collier and Ong 2005: 17). It 
means that the global aspect of the assemblages presents itself in a less explicit 
way; rather than seen as a direct global connection the analysis of the global 
in Mungiki’s changing role in the Kenyan security sector manifests itself in 
the key determinants that produce exclusion inherent in the assemblages in 
which Mungiki is enmeshed.
The emergence of militarized youth groups
Mungiki has been one of the most influential non-state actors in the political 
changes in Kenya for the last two decades. Mungiki has played a central 
role in Kenyan popular politics as a Kikuyu cultural and religious revivalist 
movement claiming to fight poverty and inequality, while also being one of the 
main protagonists in the 2007/08 post-election violence and pro-constitution 
human-rights-friendly activism in the 2010 constitutional referendum. Further-
more, Mungiki’s involvement in more mundane activities such as security and 
transport provision, garbage collection and criminal extortion has placed the 
movement and its members at the centre of poor Kenyans’ everyday concerns 
regarding security. The poor people are often marginalized from both private 
and state security provision; hence alternative modes of security organization 
have emerged (Anderson 2002; Ruteere 2011). 
Despite its religious and cultural roots, Mungiki is often associated with 
the widespread emergence of youth gangs in the 1990s, which is popularly 
perceived as a response to difficult socio-economic circumstances, increased 
urban growth, insecurity and the absence of the state in many poor areas 
of urban Kenya (Anderson 2002; Katumanga 2005; Ruteere et al. 2013). The 
Mungiki movement is widely believed to be among the most violent and influ-
ential of these gangs (Anderson 2002; Branch and Cheeseman 2008; Mueller 
2008; Maupeu 2008: 224; Kagwanja and Southall 2010). Emerging largely as 
a response to the absence of the state in poor neighbourhoods, after democ-
ratization in 1992 the youth gangs were increasingly mobilized for political 
purposes by the state and sometimes rewarded with almost unconditional 
and unsanctioned control over local areas (Katumanga 2005; Mueller 2008). 
This also characterizes Mungiki’s rise to fame as fierce security providers in 
Nairobi’s Eastlands (Maupeu 2008). Politicians showed little interest in and 
capability for demobilizing the youth militias (Branch and Cheeseman 2008: 
14–16; Mueller 2008: 189–93; Kagwanja and Southall 2010: 12–14). Certain 
levels of disorder were deemed increasingly opportune for politicians as the 
militias could be mobilized to fragment the opposition, while also serving 
as a tool for elite corruption, and lastly, in case of public outcry, the violent 
behaviour of the militias would justify strong responses against them to show 
leadership (Branch 2011). 
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However, prior to the elections of 2002 and following a particularly violent 
clash between Mungiki and a group known as ‘the Taliban’ most of the militias 
(including Mungiki) were banned (Anderson 2002). Despite the ban, many of 
the youth militias didn’t dissolve; instead they became semi-autonomous units 
that would act with impunity as guns for hire for the highest bidder. They 
were left to pursue their own interests, which were not limited to criminal 
behaviour and economic survival but included security and other order-making 
functions; and some activities became increasingly politicized (ibid.; Branch 
and Cheeseman 2008). Mungiki were probably the most multifaceted and best 
organized of the groups banned in 2002, as they were founded on a different 
basis to most of the other gangs they were associated with. Mungiki and these 
other groups operate at the margins of the state’s core areas of security seeking 
further influence and inclusion, yet, depending on the political situation, the 
state seems to allow them in while simultaneously treating them as a general 
threat to national and local security. Since the 2002 elections, the state has 
persecuted Mungiki with varying intensity by setting up secret police death 
squads to systematically kill members of the movement in an extrajudicial 
manner (Ruteere 2008; Alston 2009). This is partly seen as settling political 
scores, as Mungiki publicly supported the opposing presidential candidate in 
2002, and partly seen as an attempt to deliver the public from the militia menace. 
Mungiki’s everyday performances of security, development  
and violence
Mungiki has been active in general security provision in Kikuyu-dominated 
poor neighbourhoods where they work as night guards at marketplaces and 
parking lots. Koigi, a local Mungiki cell leader from Nairobi’s Eastlands, 
narrates how he was part of a week-long battle with Masai morans in the 
Kayole neighbourhood over the right to provide security. According to Koigi, 
Mungiki forcefully chased the Masai away by showing up in large numbers 
and beating them up. After days of violence the Masai gave up the territory 
and Mungiki took over local order-making and security functions. Koigi works 
as a night guard looking after the parked matatus (informal public transport), 
but as a cell leader he also plays a role in deciding whether or not to clamp 
down on local crime. He reveals how he has violently disciplined the local 
youth, who, in turn, have gone on to become new Mungiki recruits. In some 
areas these undertakings have had overlaps with community policing initiatives 
(Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003; Rasmussen 2010), with the difference that 
Mungiki don’t have any formal working relation with the police. According 
to Koigi and his friends in the local Mungiki cell, they provide security for 
the local vendors while the police are demanding bribes. 
Visits to the dump site next to the quarry in Kayole with Koigi and his 
friends reveal how city council garbage trucks pay ‘commission’ to Mungiki, 




members of whom have taken charge of garbage collection, and its sorting 
at the dump site. This business provides a solid income to the movement 
and jobs to the members, yet local residents have little choice but to accept 
Mungiki’s garbage services. Similar situations prevail within certain parts of the 
matatu sector (Rasmussen 2012), and the movement has expanded its service 
provision to include control of water distribution in some slum areas, as well 
as the production and retailing of counterfeit music and film at marketplaces. 
Mungiki’s ad hoc security provision has helped the movement expand its 
operational sphere in search of market shares for the movement’s members, 
and this process raises questions concerning the meaning of ‘private security’. 
Mungiki’s fees can be viewed as either taxation or extortion, and this ambi-
guity has been raising concerns about the legitimacy of Mungiki’s security 
operations. Whichever way one looks at it, the movement’s expanded security 
operations (whether forced or not) have contributed towards their political 
authority and power as well as playing a central role in institutionalizing the 
movement in Kenya. 
An illustrative example of how the state has enabled Mungiki in their 
security efforts is Mungiki’s capture of lucrative routes in the matatu industry 
in Nairobi and central Kenya. Many of the movement’s members are recruited 
from the matatu sector, which has become a central source of income for the 
movement and its individual members. Mungiki made advances in the sector 
around the time of the 2002 elections. The matatu sector had for years been 
unregulated, and many passengers considered it unsafe as it was infested with 
crime and violence. In order to control and profit from the routes, security had 
to be improved en route, at the staging points, and at the adjacent marketplaces. 
Mungiki and other non-state groups started building their capacities in this 
field and slowly began capitalizing on this. In this period, Mungiki were in 
competition with a number of other youth groups of varying organizational 
size and structure, all of whom were operating on the margins of the law, but 
in areas where the state had limited presence. In return for Mungiki’s official 
support to high-ranking politicians, Mungiki were allowed to take over routes 
from other vigilante groups without police interference (Katumanga 2005; 
Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2005). 
Ethnographic insights into the everyday operations in the matatu sector 
reveal how Mungiki’s criminal activities (such as extortion and violence) 
are perceived as similar to those of the state (Rasmussen 2012). Mungiki 
members working in the matatu sector accuse the police of systematic bribery, 
illegal arrests and fabricated charges against them. In the members’ view, 
the state’s allegedly corrupt and violent practices legitimize Mungiki’s illegal 
activities, as Mungiki in their own view are not only formally marginalized 
but also marginalized in the informal sector. While Mungiki’s engagement in 
the matatu sector provides jobs and the possibility of individual economic 
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growth for members, the movement reinforces its political potentialthrough 
the collective, and through the collection and redistribution of fees. Through 
the individual contributions to the collective, Mungiki claims to show how 
the individual is part of bringing about a collective change the state is not 
able or is unwilling to do. 
The global dimension appears to be at some distance from the everyday 
perspective of such seemingly marginalized individual members of an illegal 
organization like Mungiki. Despite their exclusion from the formalized politics 
of security, Mungiki constantly transgress into the areas under the control of 
formal security operators. Mungiki’s ongoing struggles to carve out a space for 
themselves at the local and national levels is a constant battle for inclusion or 
connection, as the assemblage of security politics in Kenya is not only about 
formation but as much about exclusion (see Collier and Ong 2005).
Mungiki and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
As previously alluded to, Mungiki members were listed among the key 
witnesses at the ICC trial against six prominent Kenyans accused of instigating 
the 2008 PEV, among them the current president Uhuru Kenyatta and his 
vice-president William Ruto. In the 2013 presidential elections, Kenyatta and 
Ruto formed what became known as the ‘alliance of the accused’ and managed 
to win the election on a dominant narrative of international vilification of the 
ethnic identities of Kikuyu and Luo represented by the core electorate of the 
two candidates (Lynch 2014). As such, the ICC intervention that sought to 
allocate responsibility for the violence and brutality of the previous election was 
successfully turned on its head and became an issue of international violation of 
Kenyan sovereignty. The international interventions pushing for redress for the 
PEV victims, and for police, military and judicial reforms, saw Mungiki placed 
in opposition to Uhuru Kenyatta, who had allegedly mobilized their violent 
services in 2008. The ongoing reforms of public security institutions and the 
increased focus on private security at all levels of Kenyan society opened up 
new spaces for non-state actors like Mungiki to become involved in security. 
The inherent tensions within the security sector in the years between the 
2008 PEV and the 2013 elections not only produced instability and partiality, 
they allowed for the emergence of new alliances influenced by the global 
forces enhancing the disassembly of the Kenyan security sector (see Collier 
and Ong 2005: 12). The intervention by the ICC invited Mungiki to position 
themselves against their alleged former patron Uhuru Kenyatta and potentially 
gain influence in national politics and issues of impunity and justice.
Sociologist Saskia Sassen has argued that the ICC belongs to a specific 
category of specialized and normative global assemblages composed of terri-
tory, authority and rights that increasingly seem to escape the grip of national 
institutional frames (Sassen 2008: 62–3). Being situated above and beyond 




the nation-state, such institutions challenge the complex interdependency 
between rights and obligation, and between power and the law, because they 
can intervene in and judge on internal matters from outside (ibid.). The ICC 
is the first global public court with universal jurisdiction among its signa-
tory member states (ibid.: 62). The ICC and similar institutions coexist with 
nation-states, meaning that the global is to be found inside the nation-state 
and in compliance with national law and order, yet at the same time they 
produce contestations and advocate a partial denationalization of authority 
(ibid.).1 Examples of such contestations could be the UN special rapporteurs 
challenging the existing culture of impunity, or Kenyan members of parlia-
ment trying to mobilize support in the African Union (AU) for a collective 
withdrawal of the Rome Statute (including the ICC). Hence, such institutions 
have the potential to unsettle existing norms within the nation-state. Given that 
the ICC accused a number of influential political figures and officials within 
the Kenyan security sector following the PEV while partly building the case 
on Mungiki members’ testimonies, the interference of such specialized global 
assemblages as the ICC further influenced the relation between Mungiki and 
the Kenyan state.
The ICC accused the current Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta of having 
allegedly bought the violent support of Mungiki to commit retaliation attacks 
against Kalenjin and the Luo people during the post-election violence in 2008 
(ICC 2015). The case against Uhuru Kenyatta has now fallen apart and the 
charges have been dropped. Allegedly, Mungiki received a large sum of money 
for these violent services, hinting at an economic and pragmatic logic to Mungi-
ki’s involvement in the PEV violence. The insufficient evidence against Uhuru 
Kenyatta leaves open the question of who was behind mobilizing Mungiki, but 
according to official reports investigating the PEV, high-ranking politicians and 
officials within the security forces assisted armed Mungiki members’ movement 
through military roadblocks to undertake the attacks (TJRC 2013; CIPEV 2008). 
Besides the financial aspects, there is an ethnic dimension whereby Mungiki 
protected the interests of poor Kikuyus who were persecuted by Kalenjin attacks. 
However, a further motive that seems to be as interesting is the possibility 
that the Mungiki used the violence to tarnish the reputation of the political 
elite who bought their services, hence seeking political influence based on 
their previous violent behaviour. Ultimately, the credibility and legitimacy of 
the Mungiki witnesses and their testimonies were brought into question, and 
this uncertainty was a central factor in the ICC case falling apart (ICC 2015). 
At the determination of the case, the ICC accused the Kenyan government of 
withholding central documents and intimidating witnesses (ibid.).
There seem to have been economic, political and security justifications 
behind Mungiki’s violent engagements in the PEV, which brought the country 
to a standstill. Regardless of who assisted Mungiki, the PEV reveals how 
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involved the Mungiki was in the fragmentation of security provision as the 
movement provided local security services while furthering its political interests 
through threats to national security and stability. Simultaneously, some state 
actors used Mungiki as a proxy for the state to do its dirty work both at the 
level of everyday local security provision and in terms of settling political and 
ethnic scores during the heightened national conflicts. 
The examples of Mungiki’s security engagements show how the movement 
constantly transgresses the boundary between the formal and the informal and 
thereby attains the power to make things work. As such, Mungiki’s security 
provision in many ways seems to be driven by their market interests and as 
such mirrors how the state’s security services have been employed for internal 
political and economic interests, as much as for securing the nation and its 
citizens (see Ngunyi and Katumanga 2012). This points to the argument made 
in the introduction that the disassembly of the security sector opens new 
spaces for alternative actors, even if the space was not filled by state agents 
in the first place. 
Mungiki’s control of the matatu industry, the violent activities, the extortion 
and the security provision, in addition to its engagement in the PEV, have 
not only placed Mungiki firmly within the wider fragmentation of the Kenyan 
security sector, they have also positioned Mungiki as a security threat, which 
was only accentuated by the possibility of Mungiki providing central witnesses 
to the ICC. As such, Mungiki became something that needed to be securitized 
(see Buzan et al. 1998). Besides police persecution for illegal activities, members 
of the movement have, as previously mentioned, been targeted by extrajudicial 
practices of the state. Over the years several hundred Mungiki members have 
disappeared and been killed (Alston 2009; KNCHR 2008). These extrajudicial 
killings and the violent persecution of Mungiki members were, according to 
the ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, part of covering up the traces of the 
political orchestration of the PEV and to intimidate Mungiki members and 
dissuade them from testifying at the ICC trial (ICC 2015: 44).
The aftermath of the PEV, especially the ICC intervention, not only influ-
enced the campaigns and results of the 2013 presidential elections (Mueller 
2014), it also impacted on the security sector and the ongoing assemblage 
processes. Not only were the Kenyan government involved in tackling external 
security threats like offshore piracy and Al-Shabaab-led terrorism, the ICC 
intervention challenged the authority of the Kenyan state through its supra-
national and universal jurisdiction (see Sassen 2008: 62). At a time of general 
debate about justice and security, the ICC intervention was used by politicians 
to centre political debate on the protection of national sovereignty rather than 
on providing justice for the victims of the PEV (Mueller 2014). The disas-
sembly of the security sector in itself doesn’t mean a threat to the authority 
of the state. Yet the emergence of non-state actors like Mungiki as security 




actors combined with the intervention of a supranational global institution like 
the ICC was suddenly perceived as a challenge to the authority of the state. 
Owing to its association with the PEV, the current regime has struggled to 
acquire legitimacy for their general security practices as they have constantly 
been caught between expectations of providing security for the people while 
sidelining the legal principles protecting citizens’ rights. The alleged political 
mobilization of Mungiki during the PEV serves as a reminder of how the state 
outsourced its violence, only to later violently persecute Mungiki in order to 
cover its tracks. The ICC case threatened to bring that into the open, and to 
legally persecute the ruling elite for the dubious security practices.
Conclusion
As the Kenyan police and military are perceived as much a security hazard as 
a guarantor of security, the majority of Nairobians have come to rely on some 
form of private security regardless of social status (Abrahamsen and Williams 
2010: 197–9). Non-state and non-corporate organizations like Mungiki present 
themselves as alternative security providers in poor locations, though embody 
the same ambiguity as public and private security providers do, namely that 
of being providers of both security and insecurity. 
This chapter has traced how Mungiki entered the limelight of violent youth 
politics in Kenya from a political perspective with regard to how the state has 
been implicated in outsourcing the use of violence, which has created room 
and potential for alternative actors to take part in the reconfiguration of the 
security landscape in Kenya. The global influences informing the securitization 
of Kenya, and Africa in general, put pressure on the Kenyan state to engage in 
international security alliances. Simultaneously, they demanded certain codes of 
conduct and allegiance to human rights. It is here that we see non-state actors 
like Mungiki emerge as security operators with political agency. The uneven 
and unequal distribution of state-sanctioned security and private-company-led 
security provision leaves a security gap in the poor areas, which is not fulfilled 
through development engagements. Hence, actors like Mungiki emerge to 
capitalize not only on the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide security in 
these areas, but also draw attention to the state’s inability to properly securitize 
these areas. Non-state actors like Mungiki appear more flexible than the state 
in terms of continually transgressing the division between a developmental 
discourse, with the aim of providing development through security, and the 
state’s unequal delivery and rights negligence in the security sector. Despite 
their flexibility, Mungiki can’t combine the two as they constantly fall into 
the role of being something that needs to be securitized. 
The general restructuring of the security landscape has not only seen a 
reconfiguration of the lines between the public and the private, but the way 
security and order are maintained has also been transformed (see Abrahamsen 
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and Williams 2009: 3). Local forms of security are expressed differently across 
social and geographical settings, and Mungiki’s security interventions in Nairobi 
and central Kenya reveal how poverty and ethnicity inform these expressions. 
Such normatively varied and unequal distribution of security highlights some of 
the exclusive consequences of the global security assemblage as they manifest 
themselves at a local level in Kenya. 
Mungiki emerged in Kenya as a response to political oppression and a lack of 
cultural recognition, through tapping into generational grievances concerning 
access to education, employment and political participation. However, the 
institutionalization of Mungiki in Kenya must partly be seen as an effect of 
the general restructuring of the security landscape, as Mungiki’s entanglement 
in various forms of security provision provided them with a platform for 
strengthening their influence on local service provision and national politics. 
The case of Mungiki exemplifies some of the ways in which the authority of 
the state is performed anew through the increased fragmentation of security 
provision and the gradual dissolution of the state’s monopoly on the use of 
violence. At the same time it reveals how the state nevertheless functions 
as a key actor in facilitating the continuous reconfiguration of security (see 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 2011). 
Despite the state persecution of Mungiki, the movement has managed to 
survive for more than two decades by continually moving in and out of posi-
tions where their security engagements can be seen as political. Simultaneously, 
these strategic adaptations have allowed Mungiki to actually become political 
in arenas beyond the security sector – for example, in relation to human rights 
issues or as part of a general political mobilization of disenfranchised youth. 
Mungiki’s involvement in the PEV shows how violent politics feeds into 
other forms of politics and political becoming. The intervention of the ICC in 
an attempt to provide justice to the victims of PEV and Mungiki’s involvement 
in the case underscore the complexity of security politics, but also of the 
global assemblage of normative agendas concerning justice and its relation 
to state authority. As such, the analytical perspective on a non-state actor 
like Mungiki in an exceptional case like the Kenyan one allows us to see 
how organizations that appears excluded and marginal to global flows and 
discourses still provide important insights into the workings and process of 
the global security assemblage.
The presentation of Mungiki as both providers of local security, as a liability 
to national and local security, and as victims of the Kenyan state’s excessive 
security undertakings adds further complexity to our understanding of the 
local implications of security reconfigurations, especially in situations where 
security actors are employed in struggles over political power and economic 
gains. As such, the global security assemblage has local consequences that 
go well beyond the security sector as it influences how supposedly marginal 




non-state actors like Mungiki carve out discrete spaces for political becoming 
through their everyday security activities. 
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Note
1 The ICC and similar institutions 
might project a global image, but the 
normative baggage they are founded on 
is based on Northern/Western values. As 
such, they are not objective or neutral; at 
least, that is what Kenyan opponents of 
the ICC intervention argue when labelling 
the ICC as a neocolonial invention.
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